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CONCLUSION: Development in One Country
*Having looked at development myths in general, we may
conclude by focussing on one country. We asked an Indian
economist, Prainit Chaudhuri1-, to select myths which had
particularly influenced the development process in his
country and to consider their effects:
Economists in general, and development economists in
particular, lack a sense of history. They are forever discover-
ing old wine in old bottles and declaring a new vintage. It
needs to be stressed, therefore, that recourse to myths to
explain the development, or lack of development of the Indian
economy can be traced to the mid-l9th century. Saddled with
economic doctrines that provided nonsense answers to the very
real problems of a poor, rural economy and needled by the
obduracy of the problems themselves, the British at that time
turned increasingly to"inter-discíplinary" solutions
- to
ethnocentric explanations in terms of religious attitudes
and the caste-structure.
Development economists and planners are today better
served by their discipline. A more sophisticated discipline
ensures self-sufficiency in myths. The purpose served by these
myths remains the same. It is to provide a simple, technical
solution to a complex problem, a general "theory" that appears
to make it unnecessary to study the dull, detailed facts of
the economic and social life of a vast and complex society.
I may limit myself to two sets of myths, one dealing
with an ideology and the other with the role of "resources"
in the development process. The latter can be sub-divided
into two sub-categories, one dealing with a kind of "resource",
viz., foreign aid and assistance, the other with a particular
end-use of resources, viz., resources devoted to agriculture
Each myth has its own hieroglyph, and uses either the
ttlanguagell of planning or of programming and/or cost-benefit
analysis.
The first myth used to be retailed in a very crude form
before, and is now put forth more temperately and constructively.
It is that too much emphasis on macro planning has led to the
failure of the Indian economy to develop at a satisfactory rate
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Two points should be made The first is that, by any historical
standard, the growth rates in the Indian economy in the Plan era
have not been unsatisfactory. In terms of the growth performanc
of the economy before the planning phase, the record has been,
if anything, highly satisfactory. The second point is that it
is idle to pretend that the allocation of resources in the India
economy can be regulated by the government for development
purposes by means of a set of micro-level decisions without
simultaneous, comprehensive macro-planning.
Coming to the second myth, it is not a contradiction to
say that though the Indian economy has done well in the planning
period, it has hardly done as well as the planners predicted,
or rather hoped for. Here, the planners turn myth-makers
The belief which gained ground, particularly from the time of
the Second Plan, was that the growth rate of the Indian economy
could be accelerated if only more external resources were made
available through foreign aid. If one believes that economic
growth is solely a matter of mobilizing resources (in the
economist's sense), such a view seems unexceptionable0 It
can be argued, however, that access to foreign aid enables
the Government to shy away from certain decisions, basically
political in nature, which are essential for the successful
transformation of an under-developed country These decisions
concern not only institutional reform but also the question
of who should bear the burden of the development effort and,
even more important, what parts of society should benefit
from the limited, short-term gains of development The
basic point is not that foreign aid is useless or unnecessary
but that in so far as it enables the Government to dodge
certain key problems, its ability to transform an economy
is more limited than planners might believe.
This brings us on to the agricultural myths. The
agricultural sector has obviously been a dominant constraint
on the growth of the Indian economy, pace social engineers
and their triangular matrices. For some time, the evidence
contained in the mid-l9th century Blue Books did not stop
observers putting the blame for low agricultural performance
on the under-motivated, caste-ridden, archetypal lazy
peasant, At present, more stress is put on the lack of
resources allocated to the agricultural sector in itself
this is a great improvement At least the sector that
acts as a bottleneck can in the first instance claim a large
share of resources. There remain, nevertheless, doubts
concerning "how much is enough" and concerning the
degree of "roundaboutness" called for in resource-inputs
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The only danger in this prescription is the one outlined
above. Namely, by putting stress on "resources", it draws
attention away from the problem that additional inputs within
the existing social and institutional structure may not
ensure continued growth of the agricultural sector. Even
more pertinently, it might create as many problems as it
solves, by exacerbating inequalities between regions or
between rural classes. Also, a perfectly legitimate stress
on a "correct" price policy ignores the basic issue -
whether the questions, who should have how much food and
shelter and at what price, can be settled via the market
in terms of effective demand. Here again, the very attractive-
ness of the technical solution increases the danger that
less attention may be paid to the basic political choices
that have to be made in order to modernize and dynamize
Indian agriculture.
No doubt capsule judgemerits do the myth-makers less than
justice. However, the basic thesis outlined above stands.
It is that experts on both, sides have tried to explain the
performance of the Indian economy in terms of alternative
myths both of which present the problem of growth as a
technical problem. But a complex human society cannot be
made to grow like wheat. It is necessary to settle the
question of who should bear the burden of the development
effort and who should share the limited i=ediate gains of
development. These are, at the root, political choices that
a society faces. Whether the myth-makers intend it or not,
by treating the Indian problem in a narrow technical context,
they enable the ruling elite to dodge these embarrassing
political choices.
*Mr. Chaudhuri brings us up against the central development
myth, that of "developmentalism". "Developmentalism" is
the belief that the possession of technical skill, somehow,
by itself, obliterates problems of social conflict and
political choice, or enables them to be by-passed. In
orel's terms, it is an intellectual delusion, a myth,
perhaps, but that of a bureaucracy. It has the
remoteness and the aspirations of myth without the
imagination and passion which give it power. Moving
restlessly from airport to Planning Office to seminar, it
is the ghost of colonialism in the mantle of revolution.
It haunts the poor but, does not walk beside them. Of all
the myths we have examined, it is perhaps that which we
could most easily do without.
